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The paper investigates the issue whether the stage-Ievel!individual level contrast introduced by 
Carlson 1977 requires the assumption of  two homonymous copulas depending on the categoriza-
tion of the predicative. We argue that instead of a uniform stage-Ievel!individuallevel distinclion 
we have to distinguish several similar but independent contrasts, none of which crucially depend 
on the semantics of the copula.  In the second part of the paper,  we concentrate on one group 
of phenomena-the distribution of weak subjects-and propose an explanation in terms  of an 
interaction between topic/commenl structure and aspectual properties of the predicate. 
1.  Introduction 
The present paper is concemed with the contrast between stage level predicates (SLPs hence-
forth) and individual level predicates (ILPs) that were proposed in Carlson 1977 and have re-
ceived a considerable amount of attention since.  Because both kinds of predicates occur in 
copular constructions, some authors like Carlson 1977, Stump 1985, Diesing 1992, and Kratzer 
1994 have taken this as indication that languages like English and German have two homony-
mous copulas, each one embedding predicatives that are SLP or ILP, respectively. Our main task 
is to investigate whether or not the arguments which are presented in these works in support of 
the homonymy assumption are compelling. 
Recent work like de Hoop and de Swart 1989; Condoravdi 1992; McNally 1994; Higginbotham 
and Ramchand 1996; Fernald 1999 and others cast some doubt whether there really is a uniform 
contrast or rather a collection of related but different distinctions.  A systematic investigation 
reveals that these doubts are substantiated; there are at least three logically independent contrasts 
that have been subsumed under the heading "SLPIILP contrasts".  Consequently, each of them 
has to receive a separate explanation.  In this paper, we will argue that neither of the contrasts 
requires an ambiguous copula, and we will propose an explanation for one of them. 
2.  The data 
Perception reports  One of Carlson's main motivation to  assurne a  division of predicates 
into "stage level" and "individual level" comes from contrasts in the acceptability of perception 
reports' Iike (cf. Carlson 1977: 124ff) 
(1)  a.  John saw Mary sneeze 
'We use the term "perception report" for constructions reporting direct perception, where the verb of perception 
is followed by an accusative NP and a non-finite predicative phrase as  in (l). Indirect perception reports where 
the complement of the matrix verb is a finite clause as in (i) have no bearing on the issues discussed in  this paper 
and are Ieft out of consideration. 
(i)  John saw that Mary sneezed 
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b.  lohn saw Mary drunk 
As Carlson observed, local PPs are virtually always acceptable in the complement of perception 
verbs, and nominals are generally excluded. APs and infinite VP behave non-uniformly: 
(2)  a.  lohn saw the president naked 
b.  *John saw the president intelligent 
(3)  a.  lohn saw Mary talk to Bill 
b.  *lohn saw Mary love Bill 
Carlson  noticed that those predicates like intelligent,  love Bill that are unacceptable in  these 
constructions-"individuallevel predicates" in his terminology-usually express permanent and 
essential properties.  Those predicates that are acceptable like drunk,  naked,  talk to Bill , i.e. 
"stage level predicates" (SLPs), tend to denote transitory and accidental properties. 
Subject effects  Carlson assumed a correlation between the behavior of predicates in the com-
plement of perception verbs and the interpretation of their subjects, if the latter are bare plurals. 
SLPs generally admit both an existential and a generic reading of a bare plural subject, while 
only the generic reading is possible with ILPs. 
(4)  a.  Firemen are available (existential/generic) 
b.  Firemen are altruistic (only generic) 
Molly Diesing (Diesing 1988, 1992) notes that similar contrasts occur with other kinds of indef-
inite subjects as weil.  We  find  the same pattern with singular indefinites (apart from the fact 
that they also admit a specific reading): 
(5)  a.  A fireman is available (existentiallgeneric) 
b.  A fireman is altruistic (only generic or specific) 
Likewise, the range of possible interpretation of weakly quantified subjects is more limited with 
ILPs than with SLPs. In the latter case, a quantifier like three children may be read existentially 
or partitively. With SLPs, only the second reading is possible. 
(6)  a.  Many firemen are available (existential and partitive) 
b.  Many firemen are altruistic (only partitive) 
These subject effects (I borrow this term from Fernald 1999) have a syntactic manifestation in 
German. Here the two possible readings of indefinite subjects are linked to their position relative 
to sentence adverbials and certain particles.  Weak subjects (like indefinites in their existential 
reading) usually  occur to  the right of these markers,  while this order is  reversed with strong 
subjects like generies and partitives.2 This is illustrated in (7). 
2Some caution is necessary here. The generalization only holds in the absence of intcrvening factors like scope 
or foeus. 
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(7)  a.  (weil) leider Feuerwehrmänner verfügbar sind. 
(SINCE) UNFORTUNATELY FIREMEN AVAILABLE ARE 
'Unfortunately, firemen are available' (only existential reading) 
b.  (weil) Feuerwehrm"anner leider verfügbar sind 
(SINCE) FIREMEN UNFORTUNATELY AVAILABLE ARE 
'Unfortunately, firemen are available' (only generic) 
Thus it is no surprise that indefinite subjects of ILPs can only occur in the position corresponding 
to the strong reading, i.e. to the left of the adverb. 
(8)  a.  *(weil) leider Feuerwehrmänner selbstlos sind. 
(SINCE) UNFORTUNATELY FIREMEN ALTRUISTIC ARE 
b.  (weil) Feuerwehrmänner leider selbstlos sind 
(SINCE) FIREMEN UNFORTUNATELY ALTRUISTIC ARE 
'Unfortunately, firemen are altruistic' 
Subjects of SLPs and ILPs also differ insofar as the latter form extraction islands, as it is illus-
trated in (9). 
(9)  a.  Feuerwehrmänner sind viele verfügbar 
FIREMEN ARE MANY AVAILABLE 
'There are many firemen available' 
b.  *Feuerwehrmänner sind viele selbstlos 
FIREMEN ARE MANY ALTRUISTIC 
'There are many firemen altruistic' 
In German it is generally possible to extract the head noun of a weak quantifier while the deter-
miner is stranded, but this option is excluded with subjects of ILPs. 
Restrictions on modifying adverbials  As Kratzer 1995 notes, only SLPs can be modified by 
temporal or frequency adverbials (according to Maienborn (this volume), matters are, however, 
less simple with respect to 10cal adverbials). 
(10)  a.  Peter spoke English today/several times 
b.  *Peter knew English today Iseveral times 
Furthermore, Kratzer notes that clauses headed by an ILP cannot serve as the restrictor in when-
conditionals, provided its arguments are definite. 
(11)  a.  *When Mary knows French, she knows it well 
b.  When Mary speaks French, she speaks it well 
Similarly, Rapoport 1991  claims that ILPs are exc1uded in depictive adjuncts (the examples are 
taken from McNally 1994): 
(12)  a.  We ate the vegetables raw 
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b.  ??We ate the vegetables organic 
FinaIly, ILPs also display so-called Iifetime effects; the tense of a clause headed by an ILP ap-
parently applies to the time of  existence of the referent of the subject rather than to the predicate 
itself.  So from (13a)  we  may  infer that Greg is  dead,  while no  such  implicature arises from 
(l3b), where the predicate is stage level. This observation is also due to Kratzer 1995:155f. 
(13)  a.  Greg was from America 
b.  Greg was in America 
Though far from being exhaustive, this list should do as a representative collection of the kind of 
phenomena that the SLPIILP distinction is supposed to cover. In the next section the three most 
influential proposals---originating from Greg Carlson, Molly Diesing and Angelika Kratzer-
are briefly reviewed. 
3.  Previous approaches 
3.1  Carlson 1977: A sortal distinction 
Carlson 1977 assurnes that the set of entities relevant for natural language semantics is split into 
three sorts:  kinds, objects and stages.  Kinds and objects are subsumed under the supersort of 
individuals.  Stages are to be thought of as  space-time slices of individuals.  Corresponding to 
these sortal distinctions, we can distinguish between properties of individuals (that are expressed 
by ILPs) and properties of stages (corresponding to SLPs).  NPs always denote quantifiers over 
individuals. In analogy to proper nouns that are names of objects, bare plurals are considered to 
be (Iifted) names of kinds.  Since quantifiers over individuals cannot be combined directly with 
properties of stages, predication with SLPs has to mediated by a template that transforms SLPs 
into ILPs. In copular constructions involving SLPs, this job is done by the copula. Its semantics 
is given by Carlson as 
Superscripts on variables indicate the sort of the respective variable as ranging over (properties 
of) stages or individuals.  The constant R is  to be read as  "is a stage of" and relates stages to 
individuals. Thus (ignoring matters of tense) a sentence Iike (l5a) in its existential reading will 
receive the translation (l5b). 
(15)  a.  Firemen are available 
b.  :JxS(R(x', FIREMEN)  /\  AVAILABLE(x
S
)) 
CruciaIly, the existential quantifier in (l5b) originates in the lexical meaning of the copula. If a 
verbal SLP is combined with a subject, the operation corresponding to the meaning of this copula 
is applied to the meaning of the VP without syntactic manifestation. ILPs can be combined with 
their subjects directly.  So in copular constructions involving ILPs, the copula has no  semantic 
function and thus denotes just the identity map on properties of individuals.  Accordingly, the 
only possible translation of (I6a) is (16b). 
CI 6)  a.  Firemen are altruistic 
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b.  ALTRUISTIC(FIREMEN) 
So in order to  avoid sortal confiicts, the stipulation of two homonymous copulas is  inevitable 
in Carlson's approach, and this homonymy is central for his explanation of the interpretation of 
bare plurals. 
The contrasts in perception reports fall  out straightforwardly from Carlson's sortal distinction. 
He assumes that a verb like see primarily denotes a relation between stages, while the embedded 
predicate is  considered to  be a secondary predicate applying to the accusative NP.  So (l7a) is 
translated as (17b). 
(17)  a.  John saw Mary drunk 
b.  ::Jx'y'(R(x"1)  1\  R(y', M)  1\  SEE(X', Y')  1\  DRl:NK(YS)) 
U  nder this approach, a sentence like 
(18)  *John saw Mary intelligent 
is ungrammatical due to a mundane sortal elash: the second argument of SEE has to be astage, 
the argument of INTELLIGENT has to be an individual, and the lexical semantics of see requires 
these two arguments to be identical in this respect. 
Apart from the fact that Carlson's theory unifies two phenomena that are logically independent-
this will be discussed at length below-it  faces to main problems. First it predicts subject effects 
only to occur with bare plurals while these are pervasive with all  sorts of indefinites.  Every 
attempt to extend his treatment of bare plurals to other indefinites would however undermine 
the central concern of his theory,  namely to  explain the differences between bare plurals and 
other indefinites. Second, his semantics of perception reports is a variant of what Barwise 1981 
calls "the naive realist's theory of perception" with its specific problems.  To  adapt Davidson's 
1969 famous argument about the identity of events, imagine a metal square that is rotating and 
simultaneously heating.  So every stage of this square that is  rotating is  also heating and vice 
versa. Accordingly, 
(19)  a.  John saw the sphere rotate 
b.  John saw the sphere heat 
should be materially equivalent, but it is easy to  imagine a scenario where the first is  true and 
the second false. 
To  sum up so far,  Carlson's sortal ontology seems unable to fully explain the contrasts that he 
addresses,  and alternative explanations are called for.  Thus there is  no  compelling reason to 
assume two sortally distinguished readings of the copula in English. 
3.2  Diesing 1992: Syntactic Differentiation 
Diesing considers the difference between SLPs and ILPs primarily as a syntactic one. She starts 
with the German word order facts  mentioned in  (7)  and  (8).  Recall that indefinite  subjects 
of SLPs can occur either to  the  left or to  the right of sentence adverbials or particles, while 
subjects of ILPs only occur to their left.  If one assumes that these adverbials and partieles are 
adjoined to VP,  this means that subjects may generally occur inside or outside VP in German 
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s-structure. Diesing identifies these two positions with SpecVP and SpecIP, respectively. Under 
these premises, subjects sitting in SpecIP may be there either due to base generation or due to 
movement. According to Diesing, ILPs and SLPs differ in this respect. Subjects of ILPs are base 
generated in the outer position. Thus they cannot be lowered into the VP (cf. (21)). Subjects of 
SLPs, on the other hand, are base generated inside VP and may optionally raised to SpecIp.3 So 
the following two configurations are possible if the predicate is SLP: 
(20)  a.  IP  b.  IP 
~  ~ 
l'  NPi  l' 
~  ~ 
I  VP  I  VP 
~  /'--.. 
NP  V'  ti  V' 
As  for ILPs,  there the subject is  base generated in  SpecIP,  and  the  "inner" subject position 
SpecVP is filled with PRO. So the only option is 
(21 )  IP 
~ 
NPi  l' 
~ 
I  VP 
~ 
PROi  V' 
As are English subjects in  general, German subjects in  the outer position are barriers and thus 
islands for extraction,  while SpecVP is  assumed to  be L-marked (cf.  Chomsky  1986).  This 
accounts for the contrast with respect to extraction iIIustrated in (9). 
Diesing adopts the view advocated by DRT (Kamp 1981; Heim 1982) that indefinites are to be 
translated as open formulas containing a free variable, and that their existential impact originates 
from an operation of existential closure that binds this variable. While standard DRT postulates 
two such operations---one applying to the nuclear scope of tripartite quantificational structures, 
and one applying at the text level-she assurnes that there is only one, applying to the material 
inside the VP at LF.  Free variables ending up  outside VP  are  bound by some superordinate 
operators.  If such an operator is not present overtly, a generic null operator is inserted.  This is 
covered by the Mapping Hypothesis (Diesing 1992: 15) 
Mapping Hypothesis: 
"Material from VP is mapped into the nuclear scope. 
Material from IP is mapped into a restrictive clause." 
Jointly these assumptions correctly predict the possib1e readings of indefinite subjects. 
3.3  Kratzer 1995: A difference in argument structure 
While Diesing's theory covers the subject effects, it does not extend to the other contrasts men-
tioned above. To do this, Kratzer 1995 proposes that the syntactic differences between SLPs and 
ILPs are ultimatel  y rooted in argument structure. 
The most striking argument in favor of this view is iIIustrated by the subsequent observation. 
'In English raising 10 SpecIP is assumed 10 be mandalory, while reconslruction al LF is optional. 
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(22)  a.  Always when a Moroccan knows French, she knows it weil. 
b.  Always when Mary knows a foreign language, she knows it weIl. 
c.  Always when a Moroccan knows a foreign language, she knows it weil. 
d.  *  Always when Mary knows French, she knows it weIl. 
Kratzer also follows Heim 1982 in the assumptions that (a) conditional sentences are mapped to 
a tripartite Logical Form consisting of a quantifier, a restrictive ciause, and a nuclear scope, and 
(b) that indefinites are interpreted as open formulae introducing a free variable into the Logical 
Form.  Hence the LF's corresponding to the sentences in (22) should look like those given in 
(23). 
(23)  a.  ALWAYSx[MARROCCAN(X)  1\  KNOW(x, FRENCH)] 
[KNOW  _WELL(x, FRENCH)] 
b.  ALWAYSy[FOREIGN_LANG(Y)  1\  KNOW(M,y)] 
[KNOW _WELL(M, y)] 
c.  ALWAYSx,y[MORROCCAN(X)  1\  FOREIGN_LANG(Y)  1\  KNOW(x, y)] 
[KNOW  _WELL(x, y)] 
d.  ALWAYS[KNOW(M, FRENCH)]  [KNOW _WELL(M, FRENCH)] 
Under this perspective, the ungrammaticality of (22d) is easily accounted for by means of the 
Prohibition against vacuous quantification 
"For every quantifier Q, there must be a variable x such that Q binds an occurrence 
of x in both its restrictive clause and its nuclear scope." (Kratzer 1995:131) 
that is obviously violated in (22d). 
Surprisingly enough, the sentence becomes nevertheless grammatical as soon as we replace the 
ILP to know French by the SLP to speak French. 
(24)  Always when Mary speaks French, she speaks it weil. 
This can be explained by the assumption that SLPs have an additional "Davidsonian" argument 
place (in the sense of Davidson 1967) for the spatio-temporal 10cation of the eventuality de-
scribed while such an argument is missing in the argument structure of ILPs.  According to this 
hypothesis, the LF of (24) is (25). 
(25)  ALWAYSs[SPEAK(M, FRENCH, s)]  [SPEALWELL(M, FRENCH, s)] 
Here the "prohibition against vacuous quantification" is fulfiIled. 
These differing argument structures are projected into syntax by means of the 'Argument Linking 
Principle' from Williams 1981. 
Argument Linking Principle: 
"In deep-structure, all arguments except the extern  al  argument are realized within 
the maximal projection of their predicate."  (Kratzer 1995:135,  originating from 
Williams 1981) 
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If we add the assumption that the Davidsonian argument always occupies the highest position in 
the argument hierarchy, we can derive the essential part of Diesing's theory, namely that SLPs 
and ILPs base generate their subjects in Spec  VP and SpecIP, respectively. 
Kratzer's idea accounts for the other contrasts mentioned in  the introduction without further 
ado. Let us start with the contrasts in perception reports. It is more or less standard nowadays to 
analyze a sentences like (I) as  reporting a relation between the perceiver and an  abstract even-
tuality that is described by the complement of the perception verb.  The nature of the perceived 
eventuality is still a matter of debate, it has been proposed that it is a situation in the sense of 
situation theory (Barwise 1981), an event in the Davidsonian sense (Higginbotham 1983) or a 
partial model (van der Does 1991).  Under either account, the logical form of (1), repeated as 
(26a), will come out roughly like (26b). 
(26)  a.  John saw Mary sneeze 
b.  :3e(SEE(J, e)  A  SNEEZE(M, e)) 
Under Higginbotham's perspective,  the perceived event is  identical to  the event that fills  the 
Davidsonian argument place of the embedded predicate.  In other words,  verbs of perception 
select descriptions of events as their complements. Therefore only predicates that supply such a 
description-SLPs under Kratzer's account-are licit there. In fact, Higginbotham 1983 already 
alludes to the option of explaining the unacceptability of certain predicates in this position as a 
consequence of the lack of a Davidsonian argument.4 
As mentioned in the beginning, ILPs cannot be modified by temporal adverbials, and at its face 
value, local modifiers are bad here as weil. 
(27)  a.  *Peter is intelligent today 
b.  *Peter was intelligent in Paris 
This falls out ofKratzer's hypothesis, provided one follows Davidson 1967, Higginbotham 1985, 
Parsons 1990 and many others in the assumption that those adverbials are predicates of the event 
argument. If the latter is missing, this kind of modification fails. 
According to  Rapoport 1991, a similar story can be told about the contrasts in (12), repeated 
here for convenience. 
(28)  a.  We ate the vegetables raw 
b.  ??We ate the vegetables organic 
Essentially, depictive (as well as circumstantial) adjuncts are semantically connected to the ma-
trix clause by some relation holding between the described events (like "simultaneity" or "re-
sult").  If either of the clauses involved does  not describe an  event,  the construction will  be 
ungrammatical. Thus ILPs are excluded both in the matrix dause and in the adjunct. 
Finally, Kratzer accommodates the lifetime effects as in (13) in an elegant manner.  All that has 
to be stipulated is that tense always applies to the external argument of the VP it attaches to.  In 
case of ILPs this is the event argument which is located in time by tense.  But with ILPs, this is 
the subject; so according to Kratzer, the logical form of (29a) is (29b). 
4 As Glasbey 1997 demonstrates, a very similar approach can be pursued in the framework of situation theory. 
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(29)  a.  Henry was French 
b.  BEFORLNOW(H)  /\  FRENCH(H) 
The first conjunct is most plausibly to be interpreted as saying that Henry's existence is located 
in the past. This accounts for the implicature of (29a) that Henry is dead at the time when (29) 
is being uttered. 
4.  The non-uniformity ofthe contrast observed so far 
Though according to the authors discussed the status of a predicate as SLP or ILP is ultimately 
rooted in the lexicon, the contrast is frequently slippery and contextual.  According to a widely 
held view,  it is  rather simple to  coerce an  ILP into an  SLP.  For instance Kratzer 1995:l55ff 
writes about (29a): 
(29a) "has two possible interpretations. On the first interpretation, we are treating be 
French as a stage level predicate. Imagine that Henry used to be French, but is now 
an American citizen. The past tense is an effective tool for turning individual-level 
predicates into stage-level predicates ....  " 
Things are not quite as simple. Even if we imagine a bizarre treaty between France and the US 
stating that people from either country may decide to be American citizens on sunny days and 
French citizens if it is rainy, (30a) will still lack an existential reading, and (30b) sounds odd 
despite past tense and supporting context which should help to reinterpret (be) French as SLP. 
(30)  a.  People from Paris were American 
b.  *We saw Henry (be) French 
As reported by McNally 1998, similar observations have been  made al ready by  Condoravdi 
1992.  So it seems that coercing a permanent property into a temporary one does not alter its 
status as ILP. On the other hand, in the given context all the following examples are fine: 
(31)  a.  Henry was French last week 
b.  John entered the room American and left it French 
c.  Whenever Henry is American, he is an awful cook 
d.  Henry was American several times 
The obvious conclusion to be drawn from this is that the diagnostics used in (31 )-modification 
by temporal or frequency adverbials, depictive adjuncts, and when-conditionals-test whether 
it denotes a permanent or a transitory property, while the tests in (30) do something different. 
Carlson 1977 was weil aware of the fact that permanence is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
a property to be individual level. He makes this point by comparing alive with young. While life 
usually lasts longer than youth, alive is stage level while young is individual level (according to 
the evidence from perception reports, that is). 
(32)  a.  We saw John alive 
b.  *We saw John young 
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This in mind, it seems worthwhile to  examine systematically to  what degree the standard test 
for stage-Ievelhood actually coincide.  To  restriet this task somewhat,  we  will exclude three 
diagnostics that are clearly not related to the SLP/ILP issue, no matter what notion we adopt. 
As de Hoop and de Swart 1989 point out, there are several predicates that are undeniably stage 
level but are still unacceptable with frequency adverbials and in the protasis of  when-conditionals 
(provided its arguments are definite). Typical examples are to die or to grow up. 
(33)  a.  *Peter grew up twice 
b.  *When Peter grows up, he inherits a fortune 
c.  *Peter died several times 
d.  *When Peter dies, he does it consciously 
According to de Hoop and de Swart, in these contexts all predicates are excluded that are "on ce 
only", i.e.  that cannot stop holding of a particular individual and start holding again later.  In 
the case of frequency  adverbials,  this would lead to  a plain contradiction.  For eonditionals, 
these authors assurne a plurality presupposition that is violated if there is only one maximal time 
span (or, alternatively, one maximal event) where the protasis is true.  Permanent predieates are 
trivially "once only", but the reverse does not hold.  So the SLP/ILP-eontrast is  not operative 
here. 
The second proviso eoneerns loeal modifiability.  Maienborn 1996 distinguishes three kinds of 
loeal modifieation:  situation internal, situation external, and frame setting.  Prototypical exam-
pies are given in (34a), (b) and (e), respeetively. 
(34)  a.  The villains eseaped on bieyc\es (situation internal) 
b.  Henri sang the Marseillaise in front ofthe eathedral (situation external) 
c.  In Australia swans are black (frame setting) 
Maienborn gives a list of syntaetic and semantic eriteria to keep these three kinds of modifieation 
apart. Spaee prevents us from going into details here. Intuitively, a modifier is situation external 
if it loealizes apart or partieipant of the deseribed situation, it is situation external if it loealizes 
the situation as  a whole,  and it is  frame  setting if it loealizes the evaluation situation rather 
than the deseribed situation.  Maienborn points out that loeal modifieation of ILPs is possible, 
but the interpretation is invariably frame  setting «34e) provides an  example).  So if there is 
an stage/individual eontrast in eonneetion with loeal modifieation, it can only coneern situation 
internal or extern  al adverbials. However, Maienborn (this volume) points out that local modifiers 
are bound to be read as  a frame setting (or possibly as a eireumstantial or depietive) adjunet if 
the modified predicate is stative, no matter whether it is SLP or ILP. 
(35)  a.  Paul was drunk in the ear when the police stopped hirn 
b.  Paul was tired in the living room 
So it appears that situation externalloeal modifiability is sensitive to  Vendler's distinetion be-
tween states and events rather than to the SLPIILP contrast. 
This being said, the eore diagnosties for stage-Ievelhood we are  left with are aeeeptability in 
pereeption reports on the one hand and subjeet effeets on the other hand.  Contrary to what is 
presupposed by the very notion of "stagelindividuallevel eontrast", a thorough investigation of 
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the data reveals that these two diagnostics are logically independent, and furthermore, they are 
both independent from the permanent/transitory distinction, For ease of reference, let us assume 
three binary features [WS], [PR] and [TR], A predicate is [+WS] iff it admits a weaklexistential 
reading of indefinite subjects, it is  [+PR] iff it can occur in the infinite complement of verbs of 
perception, and it is [+ TR] iff it denotes a transitory property, i,e, it admits temporal modification 
without lifetime effects and can occur in depictive adjuncts, So prototypical SLPs receive a "+" 
for all three features and prototypical ILPs a "-", Trivially, there are eight possible combinations, 
listed in the chart below, 
[WS]  [PR]  [TR] 
A  +  +  + 
B  +  +  -
C  +  - + 
D  +  - -
E  - +  + 
F  - +  -
G  - - + 
H  - - -
There are representatives for all eight combinations, 
A  These are the prototypical SLPs, i.e, all non-stative VPs and locative PPs 
(36)  a,  People shouted (existential reading possible) 
b,  We heard Jon shout 
c,  After the victory, the fans shouted 
(37)  a,  Kids are in the garden (existential reading possible) 
b,  We saw Jon in the garden 
c,  Jon was in the garden at 12 
B  Verbs of position like sit, stand, lie belong into that dass (in their stative reading, besides 
they have an  activity reading that belongs into the previous dass, cf. Dowty 1979).  Fur-
thermore locative PPs can behave that way provided the  subject refers to  an  object that 
doesn't move, Jike geographical terms. Temporal modification is generally possible there, 
but these modifiers restrict the time of existence of the subject referent.  Thus the pred-
icates qualify as  permanent.  The existence of this dass was  noticed in McNally  1998, 
where some of the examples are taken from. 
(38)  a.  Cities lie along that river (existential reading possible) 
b.  From the airplane, we saw cities lie along that river 
c.  Centuries aga cities lay along that river =} They don't exist anymore. 
(39)  a.  Large forests were on either side of the canyon (existential reading possible) 
b.  We saw large forests on either side of the canyon 
c.  In prehistoric times,  large forests  were on  either side of the canyon =} They 
don't exist anymore. 
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C  Some of the classical SLPs Iike available or present fall into that cJass, i.e.  they cannot 
appear in perception reports even though they Iicense weak subjects and express temporary 
properties. 
(40)  a.  Firemen are available/present (existential reading possible) 
b.  *We saw Peter (be) available/present 
c.  Peter was available/present yesterday 
D  The predicate situated at this river is semantically similar to the examples from group B, 
but it is odd in perception reports 
(41)  a.  Large cities are situated at this river 
b.  ??We saw large cities (*be) situated at this river 
c.  Large cities were situated at this river '* they don't exist anymore 
E  The cJassical adjectival SLPs that do not fit into cJass C like naked, drunk, siek, alive etc. 
belong here.  Glasbey  1997 notes that the existential reading can  be  ameliorated by the 
contextual setting, but without this the existential reading is definitely bad. 
(42)  a.  Emperors are nakedldrunkl  ...  (generic reading strongly preferred) 
b.  We saw the emperor nakedldrunkl  ... 
c.  The emperor was nakedldrunkl  ... yesterday cf? He is dead. 
F  Fernald 1999: 11  (who attributes it to Jack Hoeksema) mentions the only sampie of this 
class that I am aware of, namely to tower over.  Of course the issue whether this is per-
manent or not depends on the choice of the arguments.  As  with the examples from the 
previous class, the weak reading of the subject can be improved by the contextual setting, 
but in the null context it is virtually excluded. 
(43)  a.  Skyscrapers tower over the Empire State Building (generic reading strongly pre-
ferred) 
b.  We saw the World Trade Center tower over the Empire State Building 
c.  Next year, the new skyscraper will tower over the Empire State Building '* It 
doesn't exist yet. 
G  As mentioned in the beginning of this section, many standard examples for ILPs fail  to 
express permanent properties, like Carlson's example young.  Verbal examples from this 
class are have (as a full verb), love,  hate, know etc. Also quite a few NPs, Iike a referee, a 
father,  the president etc., express temporary properties. 
(44)  a.  Kids have toys (only generic) 
b.  *We saw the kid have a toy 
c.  Bill had a new toy last week, but he lost it cf? Bill is dead. 
(45)  a.  Semanticists are referees (only generic) 
b.  *We saw the semanticist (be) a referee 
c.  The professor of semantics was a referee last year cf?  He is dead. 
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H  Finally we have a group of "genuine" ILPs that pass all tests, like to be of  ltalian descent 
or to have blue eyes 
(46)  a.  Swedes have blue eyes (only generic) 
b.  *We saw the Swedish colleague have blue eyes 
c.  *He had blue eyes last year 
This list shows that it is misleading to talk about the SLP/ILP contrast without further qualifi-
cation. Rather we have to apply some scrutiny to every alleged stagelindividuallevel diagnostic 
separately to identify the lexical, syntactic or semantic features that it sensitive to (see also Hig-
ginbotham and Ramchand 1996 for a similar conclusion). For Kratzer's and Diesing's proposal 
this result is less damaging than one might think; recall that Diesing's concentrates on subject 
effects, while Kratzer is  mainly concerned with adverbial modification (the contrasts relating 
to perception reports are not explicitly mentioned but fall out automatically from her proposal). 
Thus their accounts might still be valid, and only the connection via William's "Argument Link-
ing Principle" faulty. So our initial question "Does the SLP/ILP contrast provide evidence for an 
ambiguous copula" remains, but it splits into several questions now, one for each contrast that 
we identified. 
5.  Argument structure 
In the remainder of this paper we will focus attention to subject effects, and we do not attempt an 
explanation for the [+/-TR] and [+/-PR] contrasts. However, we do not think that either provides 
evidence for an ambiguous copula. Let us start with permanence vs. temporarity. We take it that 
this issue is entirely determined by world knowledge and should not be represented in grammar 
at all. There are mainly two arguments that lead us to this conclusion. First, the issue whether a 
predicate is permanent or not does not depend solelyon the meaning of the predicate itself but 
may be determined by the subject or the pp as weil. This can be seen from examples like 
(47)  a.  The secretary of state is (currently) in Africa i? He is dead 
b.  Carthago was in Africa =} Carthago does not exist anymore 
c.  Riga was in the USSR i? Riga does not exist anymore 
In the first sentence, the predicate be in Africa is temporary (temporal modification is possible, 
no lifetime effects), while it is [-TR]  in (47b).  To stipulate an ambiguity in this case would be 
entirely ad hoc.  Furthermore, it has been noted time and again that almost all predicates can 
become [+TR]  in  an  appropriate setting.  As Chierchia 1995:178 puts it,  if we "imagine that 
John has a double personality which involves switching his mental capacities on and off in an 
abnormal manner" , (48) is fine: 
(48)  John was intelligent on Tuesday, but a vegetable on Wednesday 
I'd like to stress that this is not an instance of coercion; we changed our background knowledge, 
not the meaning of intelligent. 
If permanence is not represented grammatically, the contrasts relating to it must be pragmatic 
in nature.  This idea has been  worked out successfully for depictives by  McNally  1994 and 
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for lifetime effects by Musan 1997.  I am confident that a similar approach can be pursued for 
temporal modification, but I willleave that for another occasion. 
The discussion up to now has shown that Kratzer's arguments in favor of different argument 
structures largely dissolve. According to de Hoop and de Swart 1989, the acceptability of when-
eonditionals depends on whetherthe predicate in question is "onee only". Ifthe eonsiderations in 
the previous paragraph are eorreet, temporal modifiability and lifetime effects are determined by 
pragmatics (at any rate, they are independent from the other SLP/ILP distinctions).  As Maien-
born (this volume) shows, (situation external) loeal modifiability is sensitive for the distinetion 
[+/- stative].  In the next section we will  collect arguments that subject effects should not be 
reduced to d-structure configuration (and thus not to argument structure either). 
Two  arguments in favor of a difference in argument structure remain however.  This argument 
struetural aceount offers a simple explanation for the [+/-PR] contrast.  So one might assume 
with Higginbotham 1983 that [+PR]  predieates do  have a Davidsonian argument while [-PR] 
predicates don't. Sirnilar in spirit, Maienborn (this volume) proposes to reeonstruct the distine-
tion between statives and non-statives in this way.  Aeeording to her, non-stative predicates have 
a full-blown event argument while statives only have a temporal argument instead.  In the case 
of copular constructions, she assumes that the predicative is  simply a property of individuals, 
while the temporal argument is introduced by the copula.  This aecounts for the inacceptability 
of situation extern  al  local modifiction in these construetions.  Furthermore it explains the fact 
noted by Carlson 1977 that a complex copula+predicative is invariably [-PR] (leaving active be 
in the sense of Partee 1977 out of consideration). 
(49)  We saw John (*be) drunk 
However, the motivation to assurne a Davidsonian argument in the first plaee applies to stative [-
PR] arguments as weil. The main evidence for this proposal is the fact that eertain adverbials like 
local, temporal or manner modifiers are always factive and do not display scope ambiguities (cf. 
Parsons 1990). To the degree that stative [-PR] predicates are compatible with such adverbs, the 
case can be made with these predicates too (see also Chierchia 1995 for a similar argumentation). 
(50)  a.  John was a Catholie with great passion in his youth 
b.  John was a Catholic in his youth 
c.  John was a Catholic with great passion 
d.  John was a Catholic 
We  observe the inference patterns characteristic for event related adverbial modification, i.e. 
(50a) entails (50b,c,d), and both (50b) and (50c) entail (50d). 
Furthermore a Davidsonian semantics is  superior to  a standard treatment since it predicts that 
event related adverbs are transparent even though they cannot be treated as  extensional if we 
identify the extension of a property with the set of objects that have this property.5  So even if 
the same persons are walking and talking, (51a,b) need not be materially equivalent. 
(51)  a.  lohn is walking quickly 
b.  John is talking quickly 
5r adopt this argument as well as the next example from Eckardt 1996a. 
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On the other hand, if we know that Liz and the present Queen 01 England are co-extensional, the 
following two sentences are materially equivalent: 
(52)  a.  Phil is kissing Liz quickly 
b.  Phil is kissing the Queen of England quickly 
Under an event based approach, we may assume quickly to be extensional since even ifthe same 
persons are walking and talking, the walking events are distinct from the talking events and thus 
the predicates are not co-extensional. 
This argument can be applied to  statives as  weIl.  The adverb losely is  not extensional in  the 
standard sense-the set of individuals that are acquainted with Liz is insufficient to determine 
the set of individuals that are losely acquainted with Liz-but it is nevertheless transparent.  In 
the above setting, the following two statements are materially equivalent, too. 
(53)  a.  Helmut is losely acquainted with Liz 
b.  Helmut is losely acquainted with the Queen of England 
So if we consider the arguments for a Davidsonian treatment compelling, we are forced to  as-
surne that statives have a Davidsonian argument too.  Finally it  should be remarked that the 
origin of this argument place cannot be the copula since the same kind of adverbial modification 
of statives is also possible in small clauses or -ing-adverbials. 
(54)  a.  A catholic with great passion in his youth, lohn later became a protestant 
b.  BeinglHaving been a catholic with great passion in  his youth, lohn later became a 
protestant 
c.  Losely acquainted with Liz, Helmut visits her every now and then 
d.  BeinglHaving been losely acquainted with Liz, Helmut visits her every now and then 
For these reasons, I conclude that all predicates have a Davidsonian argument.  Thus there is 
no motivation for an ambiguous copula as far as argument structure is concerned. Maienborn's 
obvervations should be accounted far by the assumption that the Davidsonian argument of sta-
tives is astate and not an event proper, and that events but not states are localized in space. The 
contrast between [+PR] and [-PR] predicates is left as an open problem for the time being. 
6.  Subject effects reconsidered 
6.1  Subject positions in German 
Diesing's primary motivation far explaining subject effects in terms of d-structural subject po-
sitions are the German ward order effects discussed in subsection . In this section we will cast 
some doubt at this approach; we will argue that the alleged SLP/ILP-differences only show up 
at s-structure and PF as far as syntax is concerned. 
To  start with,  Diesing restriets her attention to  indefinite subjects.  If we  take other sorts of 
NPs into account, the picture changes considerably. Let us start with definite NPs. With a [-WS] 
predicate, matters are as predicted by Diesing's theory (as long as we contain ourselves to neutral 
contexts and neutral intonation). 
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(55)  a.  (weil) der Präsident ja intelligent ist 
(SINCE) THE PRESIDENT PRT INTELLIGENT IS 
b.  *(weil) ja der Präsident intelligent ist 
(SINCE) PRT THE PRESIDENT INTELLIGENT IS 
'The president is intelligent' 
As far as the plain word order facts are concerned, things are also as expected. Adefinite subject 
of a [+WSj predicate licenses both the inner and the outer subject position. 
(56)  a.  (weil) die Berge ja sichtbar sind 
THE MOUNTAINS  PRT VISIBLE ARE 
b.  (weil) ja die Berge sichtbar sind 
PRT THE MOUNTAINS  VISIBLE ARE 
'The mountains are visible' 
It is less expected that there is a subtle semantic difference between (56a) and (b).  The former 
represents a categorical statement in the sense of Kuroda 1972 (see also Sasse 1987), i.e. it is a 
statement about the mountains. To be felicitous, the mountains have to salient in the discourse. 
In other words,  this definite NP behaves like one would expect if one assumes a familiarity 
theory of definiteness like Heim 1982. Sentence (56b), on the other hand, is a thetic statement. 
It reports a scene or an event, and the referent of the subject NP might be entirely novel in the 
discourse. It is hard to see how this difference could be captured in terms of variable binding, as 
the Mapping Hypothesis would lead us to expect. We will return to this issue below. 
The picture changes altogether if we turn our attention to strang quantifiers. Quantifiers headed 
byalle 'all' or jeder 'every' generally occur preferably to the right of the particle, i.e. VP inter-
nally, no matter what sort of predicate we take.6 
(57)  a.  weil ja alle Studenten Englisch können 
SINCE PRT ALL STUDENTS ENGLISH  KNOW 
b.  ??weil alle Studenten ja Englisch können 
SINCE ALL STUDENTS  PRT ENGLISH  KNOW 
'all students know English 
(58)  a.  weil ja alle Studenten Englisch sprechen 
SINCE PRT ALL  STUDENTS  ENGLISH SPEAK 
b.  ??weil alle Studenten ja Englisch sprechen 
SINCE ALL STUDENTS  PRT ENGLISH SPEAK 
'all students speak English 
Furthermore, under certain conditions it can be shown that generic bare plurals that occur outside 
VP bind a trace inside VP.  Association with focus is a case in point. Consider example (59). 
(59)  (weil) REINrassige Hunde ja AUCH intelligent sind 
PURE-BRED DOGS  PRT ALSO INTELLIGENT ARE 
'PURE-bred dogs are intelligent too' 
6These judgements are not shared by all speakers, some consider the (a)-versions and the (b)-versions equally 
acceptable. 
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The focus  sensitive particJe auch  'also' is  associated with a focus  on the subject reinrassige 
Hunde 'pure-bred dogs'.  If we accept that the particJe ja is adjoined to  VP,  the focus particle 
auch cannot possibly be higher. Independently of the particular framework for the interpretation 
of focus that we might adopt, the focused item must be in the scope of the associating particle 
at LF. Thus it appears that it is possible to reconstruct the subject into a position inside VP. Note 
that the interpretation of this subject is nevertheless generic. 
While the previous example could still be accounted for by  assuming that the focus  particJe 
obligatorily scrambles at LF,  this will not work in cases where the focus particle is nur 'only' 
or sogar 'even'.  They assume a position to  the right of the discourse particle ja and must c-
command the associated focus on s-structure. 
(60)  a.  weil ja sogar FEUERWEHRMÄNNER selbstlos sind 
SINCE PRT EVEN FIREMEN ALTRUISTIC ARE 
b.  ??weil FEUERWEHRMÄNNER ja sogar selbstlos sind 
SINCE FIREMEN PRT EVEN ALTRUISTIC ARE 
Here too, the bare plural can only be read as generic. 
Of course these observation might be countered by taking resort to  the claim that the partic1e 
ja as  weil as all adverbials that behave similarly can scramble too.  Diesing 1992:53 explicitly 
considers this option. This can be excluded by observations re1ating to scope.  Frey 1993 gives 
convincing evidence that scope relations in German can be determined from s-structure. To make 
a lang story short, a scope inducing element 00  can take scope over a scope inducing element ß 
if and only if 00  c-commands the syntactic base position of ß at s-structure.  This can be used 
to decide between the two possible s-structures of (57) if we add some scope inducing adverb 
like manchmal 'sometimes' that occurs to  the right of the particle ja.  To  make both potential 
readings pragmatically plausible, we change the predicate to die Antwort wissen 'to know the 
answer' , which is [  -WS] as weIl. Furthermore, to exclude intervening focus effects, we add the 
particle tatsächlich 'indeed' that induces verum focus.  (6Ib,c) gives the two possible structures 
for (6Ia), the first one being in  line with Diesing's assumptions, the second one assuming that 
the subject is base generated and remains in Spec  VP. 
(61)  a.  (weil) ja tatSÄCHlich manchmal alle Studenten die Antwort wissen 
b. 
PRT INDEED SOMETIMES ALL STUDENTS THE ANSWER KNOW 
'Sometimes indeed all students do know the answer' 
IP 
~ 
Advi  IP 
some~imes  N~' 
J 
~ 
all students ~ 
I  VP 
~ 
tj  VP 
~ 
PROj  know the ans wer 
81 Gerhard Jäger 
c.  IP 
~ 
I' 
~ 
I  VP 
~ 
Adv  VP 
I 
sometimes  ~ 
NP  V' 
~~ 
all students  know the ans wer 
According to the scrambling structure (61b), both readings should be possible since the adverb 
c-commands the subject and the subject c-commands the trace of the adverb.  The in situ struc-
ture (6Ic) predicts only the reading which corresponds to  the surface order to be possible, i.e. 
sometimes»  all students. This is in fact the only reading that (6Ia) can have. 
It is stilI possible to save base generation of the subject in SpecIP if one assurnes that the adverb 
is  base generated as  an  IP adjunct,  but this seems unlikely since manchmal 'sometimes' and 
similar adverbs quite regularly occur to the right of particles like ja. 
(62)  a.  (weil) Peter ja manchmal selbstlos ist 
PETER PRT SOMETIMES ALTRUISTIC rs 
b.  ?(weil) manchmal Peter ja selbstlos ist 
SOMETIMES PETER PRT ALTRUISTIC rs 
'Sometimes Peter is altruistic' 
To conclude this discussion, there is strong evidence that subjects are generally base generated 
inside VP (or at least to  the right of the base position of senten ce adverbs  and particIes) in 
German. Under this perspective, Diesing's word order effects should be considered as a question 
of option  al vs. obligatory scrambling. 
6.2  Scrambling and topics 
In view ofthe fact that strong quantifiers may (or sometimes even must) stay in situ, the issue of 
subject scrambling cannot simply be reduced to the weak/strong dichotomy.  Instead l'  d like to 
argue that-in the absence of intervening effects like focus or scope-topic/comment structure 
is decisive for the position of argument NPs in German, incIuding subjects.7 There are basically 
two observations that support this view.  As ilIustrated in (56), German distinguishes thetic and 
categorical judgments syntactically by the position of the  subject.  In  eategorical statements, 
where the subjeet is a topic by definition, it serambles obligatorily, while in thetie statements it 
remains in situ. 
The second evidenee comes from proportion readings of conditional donkey sentenees.  Chier-
ehia 1992 argues eonvincingly that the ehoiee of a subjeet asymmetrie, objeet asymmetrie or 
symmetric reading of a sentence like (63) is determined by the topic!comment strueture of the 
protasis. 
7r  made this proposal originally  in  Jäger 1995  in  connection with  a dift'erent set 01'  data relating  to  objeet 
scrambling. See also Meinunger 1996 for a comprehensive investigation of the issue. 
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(63)  If a farmer owns a donkey, he usually beats it 
It is well-known that this sentence might be read as a quantification over farmers, over donkeys, 
or over farmer-donkey pairs.  Chierchia claims that generally those indefinites in the protasis 
that are topics are bound by the adverb of quantification, while non-topical indefinites receive 
an existential interpretation. He illustrates this with the following example. 
(64)  a.  "Dolphins are truly remarkable. When a trainer trains a dolphin, she usually makes 
it do incredible things." (topic = 'dolphins') 
b.  "Trainers from here are absolutely remarkable with all sorts of animals. For example, 
if a trainer from here trains a dolphin,  she usuaJly makes it do  incredible things." 
(topic = 'a trainer from here') 
(from Chierchia 1992: 121) 
The preferred reading of the (a)-sentence is objeet asymmetrie (quantifieation over dolphins), 
while the subject asymmetrie interpretation is dominant in (64b).  The supplied eontexts make 
clear that the topie ofthe protasis is a dolphin in (64a), but a trainer/rom here in (64b). 
On the other hand, there is a eorrelation between German scrambling and proportion readings. 
This is diseussed extensively in Kratzer 1995. In a nutshell, scrambled indefinites are bound by 
the adverb of quantifieation, while indefinites in situ are bound existentially.  A niee minimal 
pair that illustrates this effect is due to Krifka 1998: 17: 
(65)  a.  weil einer alten Dame gewöhnlich eine Katze gehört 
A OLD LADY (DAT) USUALLY A CAT (NOM) BELONGS 
'Most old ladies own a eat' 
b.  weil eine Katze gewöhnlich einer alten Dame gehört 
A CAT (NOM) USUALLY A OLD LADY (DAT) BELONGS 
'Most eats belong to an old lady' 
Here subject serambling and objeet serambling very neatly eorrespond to the subjeet asymmet-
rie reading and the objeet asymmetrie reading respectively.  So if we assume that serambling is 
triggered by topic-hood and adopt Chierchia's proposal, we keep Kratzer's insights about seram-
bling and proportion readings without being eommitted to Diesing's syntaetie assumptions. 
So the following pieture arises: 
1.  Those NPs that can be subjects of thetic statements-non-anaphorie definites and existen-
tial indefinites-remain in situ at s-strueture. 
2.  Topics, Le.  anaphorie definites, partitive weak quantifiers, specifie indefinites and indefi-
nites bound by a superordinate operator are scrambled. 
3.  The topie/non-topie distinction does  not apply to  strong quantifiers,  so their position is 
determined by other faetors (notably scope). 
4.  Scrambling may be blocked by other faetors like seope and focus. 
This simple picture requires immediate qualification though. It has been noted by several authors 
(like Meinunger 1996;  de  Hoop  1997; Krifka  1998) that in  many  cases,  scrambling is  truly 
optional. For example, if we omit scrambling in (65b), we get the same interpretation and only 
a very subtle deerease in aeeeptability (if there is any). 
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(66)  weil gewöhnlich eine Katze einer alten Dame gehört 
USUALLY A CAT (NOM) A OLD LADY (DAT) BELONGS 
'Most cats belong to an old lady' 
In (66) the subject eine Katze 'a cat' is in in situ, but it is nevertheless bound by the adverb and 
thus to be considered as  a topic.  I have to  admit that I cannot offer a satisfactory explanation 
for this fact at the present time.  Meinunger 1996 proposes that the semantic characteristics 
of topics-anaphoricity or discourse link.ing in a broad sense-are necessary but not sufficient 
condition for an  NP to  be a topic.  This allows hirn to  maintain the generalization that topics 
scramble obligatorily. I have certain reservations about this move. To cover Diesing's extraction 
facts, Meinunger proposes a principle called "Generalized Specificity Condition" saying "Topics 
are weak islands". Under this perspective, we have another diagnostics for the topic status of the 
subject NP in (66b), and it clearly indicates that it is a topic: 
(67)  a.  (weil) einer alten Dame gewöhnlich [eine Katze], gehört, die, sehr verwöhnt ist 
A OLD LADY (DAT) USUALLY A CAT  (NOM) BELONGS THAT VERY SPOILT IS 
'Most old ladies own a cat that is very spoilt' 
b.  *(weil) [eine Katze]i gewöhnlich einer alten Dame gehört, die, sehr verwöhnt ist 
A CAT USUALLY A OLD LADY BELONGS THAT VERY SPOILT IS 
'Old ladies own most cats that are very spoilt' 
c.  *(weil) gewöhnlich [eine Katze]i einer alten Dame gehört, die, sehr verwöhnt ist 
USUALLY A CAT A OLD LADY BELONGS THAT VERY SPOILT IS 
'Old ladies own most cats that are very spoilt' 
As (67a) indicates, a relative clause modifying a non-topic NP can be extraposed, while extrapo-
sition is blocked in (67b) where the subject is a topic both under Meinunger's and my conception 
of"topic". The critical example is (67c); here the subject is bound by the adverb of quantification 
and thus according to Chierchia a topic, while it is not scrambled and thus no topic according to 
Meinunger.  Extraposition is as bad here as in (67b).  So if topic-hood makes an NP an island, 
we are forced to  assume that the generalization "Topics scramble" is a preference rather than 
a hard constraint.  The very same conclusion is  drawn by de Hoop 1998, who formulates this 
finding in terms of the interaction of soft constraints in the sense of Optimality Theory. What is 
crucial for the purpose of the present paper is this:  einer alten Dame gehören 'to be owned by 
an old lady' is a [-WS] predicate, and its subject has to be construed as a topic. There is a strong 
tendency for those subjects to scramble, but scrambling is not obligatory. So the crucial feature 
of [-WS] predicates is that there subjects must be construed as topics, while the position of the 
subject is determined by several factors, topic-hood being only one of them.  Thus it cannot be 
fixed already at d-structure. 
6.3  Towards an explanation of subject effects 
If the considerations from the previous subsection are  basically correct,  [  -WS]  predicates are 
characterized by the fact that their subjects must be construed as topics.  In  other words, these 
predicates  are  unable  to  constitute thetic statements.  Since Ladusaw  1994,  several  authors 
(Krifka et al.  1995; Eckardt 1996b; Ramchand  1996; Jäger 1997; McNally  1998,  in  a sense 
also Kratzer 1994) have reached this very conclusion on different ways. The proposed explana-
tions for this fact differ though. Ladusaw 1994 assurnes that the denotations of [+ WS] and [  -WS] 
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predicates belong to ontologically different sorts (the former being parameterized event descrip-
tions, the latter properties), Thus he puts the base for the explanation back into the lexicon. This 
seems unlikely, though, in view of the fact that the [+/-] WS status of a transitive verb sometimes 
depends on the status of the object, a phenomenon that Fernald 1999 calls "specificity effect". 
The subsequent examples are his8 
(68)  a.  Monkeys live in trees (generic only) 
b.  Monkeys live in that tree (existential possible) 
(69)  a.  Tycoons own banks (generic only) 
b.  Tycoons own that house (existential possible) 
(70)  a.  Presidents are similar to senators (generic only) 
b.  Presidents are similar to these senators (existential possible) 
McNally  1998 first considers Chierchia's 1995 proposal that ILPs  are  inherently generic,  but 
she rejects it as  it excludes the possibility of having temporary  [  -WS] predicates.  Instead she 
proposes that "Iocation independence" is  the crucial factor of theticity.  According to  her,  a 
sentence like 
(71)  Plates are dirty 
excludes a thetic reading due to the fact that-intuitively speaking-dirty plates remain dirty if 
you bring them to another place. This proposal is not without merits; it explains why a handful 
of adjectives Iike available, visible, present are [+WS], while the bulk of the adjectives is [-WS]. 
An  available (visible, present) object or person might ce ase to be available (visible, present) if 
you bring it to another place.  McNally furthermore gives the following examples (taken from 
the literature) as evidence for her approach: 
(72)  a.  ??Holes were in those pants 
b.  ??Dents were under the driver's side window 
c.  ??Space was on the counter 
d.  ??Pains are in my arm 
e.  ??Riots were in the square 
These statements are location independent; if some pants have holes, this doesn't change if you 
change the location of the pants (or the holes). Consequently, an existential reading is excluded 
in these sentences. 
Even though these facts are intriguing, I think that the cited examples actually prove the opposite. 
In German they make perfect thetic statements: 
(73)  a.  (weil) Löcher in dieser Hose waren 
'There were holes in these pants' 
'Kratzer 1995 discusses related examples. She claims that this effeet is due to the un-accusativity of the verbs 
involved. Fernald's examples show that this explanation cannot be correct. 
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b.  (weil) Beulen unter dem Fenster auf der Fahrerseite waren 
'There were dents under the driver's side window 
As the translations indicate, these statements are perfect in a thetic construal in English too as 
soon as we use there insertion. Though I have no explanation why there insertion is mandatory 
here, location dependence cannot be a decisive factor for theticity. 
To get a better grip on the problem, we have to figure out what it means for a statement to be 
thetic.  By definition, thetic statements are those propositions that lack a topic.  If this were the 
whole story and Chierchia 1992 is right about the correlation between topic/comment structure 
and proportion readings,  we  would expect thetic statements to  be excluded in  the protasis of 
atemporal when-conditiona1s due to vacuous quantification. This is not the case though: 
(74)  Always if the PREsident dies, the vice president succeeds in his place. 
This sentence is perfectly acceptable. It expresses a quantification over events. So we conclude 
that thetic statements are not really topic-less but that the reported event is the topic. 
The second step towards a (partial) explanation has to address the question what it means for an 
expression to be a topic in terms of semantics.  From the discussion in the previous subsection 
it became transparent that topics have two characteristic semantic features:9  They are discourse 
linked or anaphoric in a broad sense, and, if they are indefinite, they are bound by superordinate 
operators.  I insist on the qualification "in a broad sense" since the relation to their antecedent 
might be an indirect one, mediated by "bridging". This is illustrated below. 
{ 
The roOf} .  (75)  John has a cottage.  It  IS made from straw 
The roof that is  referred to by the topic of the second sentence is  not mentioned before in the 
discourse.  Therefore we cannot use an anaphoric pronoun to  refer to it.  A topical definite NP 
is fine though since we can establish a salient bridging relation between the newly introduced 
discourse referent for the roof and a familiar discourse referent introduced by a cottage.  The 
same applies ceteris paribus to  partitive weak quantifiers,  where the bridging relation is  the 
subset relation in the simplest case. 
(76)  Several kids of either sex were present. Three girls/ were blond \ 
In Jäger 1996 I demonstrated that the other peculiarity of topics, i.e. their ability to be bound by 
superordinate operators, can be derived from the fact that they are anaphoric modulo bridging. 
I'll sketch a simplified version here that owns part of its design to Krifka 1998. 
We choose a dynamic setting in the sense of Groenendijk and Stokhof 1991, i.e. the meaning 
of a sentence is  identified with its context change potential.  We  adopt the notion of context 
employed in  Heim 1983,  i.e.  a context is  a set of pairs consisting of a possible world and a 
partial assignment function sending referential indices to objects.  As representation language 
we chose first order logic with an interpretation in the spirit of Groenendijk and Stokhof 1991, 
but including possible worlds.  The notion of a model  is  entirely standard.  The letter 0  is  a 
metavariable over contexts. If  an assignment function hextends assignment 9 with a value for x 
(formally: 'la(h =  gU {(x,a)})), we writeg <x  h.
lO 
9If we confine ourselves to tmth conditions and presuppositions, that iso  Intuitively topks are  what a sentence 
is abaut, but aboutness is anation that is not covered by the standard semantic inventory. 
IONote that it is not required that x  ~  dom(g). 
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Definition 1 
1.  IIP(XI,' ",cn)ll(o-) =  {(w,g) E o-l(g(XI),.",g(xn )) E  11P11(w)} 
2.  Iitl = t211(0-)  = {(w,g) E o-llltlllw,g = IIMw,y} 
3.  11~4>11(0-) =  {(w,g) E  0-1~3h::2 g((w,h) E  114>11(0-))} 
4.  113x4>II(0-)  = 114>11({(w,h)lg <x h  /\  (w,g)  E o-}) 
5.  114>  /\  7f;11(0-)  =  117f;11(114)11(0-)) 
Furthermore we augment the language with aversion of Beaver's 1992 presupposition operator 
8. Intuitively, updating a context with the formula 84> has no elfect except possibly introducing 
new discourse entities if the content of  4>  can be inferred from the context; otherwise the update 
fails. 
6.  1184>11(0-)  =  {  114>11(0-)  ifVw,h((w,h) E  114>11(0-)  ---+  3g((w,g)  E  0- /\ 9 c::  h))  } 
undefined else 
As in Dynamic Predicate Logic and related formalisms, (non-topical) indefinites are translated as 
restricted existential quantifiers. So an indefinite introduces a novel discourse entity. Pronouns 
are translated as free variables, i.e. to be interpretable the mus! refer to familiar entities.  Non-
topical definites are treated in a Russellian way; like indefinites they introduce a novel discourse 
marker, and additionally they require its uniqueness.  So the translation of the (thetic) sentence 
(77a) is (77b), abbreviated as (77c). 
(77)  a.  The PREsident died 
b.  3X(PRESIDENT(X)  /\  ~3y(PRESIDENT(y) /\  x  =  y)  /\  DIE(X)) 
c.  3!XPRESIDENT(X)  /\  D1E(x) 
Marking an NP as topical has two elfects. First it makes the NP anaphoric moduln bridging. This 
is done by relating the variable that is introduced by the NP to a familiar variable via a bridging 
relation R. It is not our concern hefe how the value of this relation is to be determined; suffice 
it to  say that it must be a cognitively salient relation like "part-of" etc.  The default value of R 
is just the identity relation.  Furthermore topic marking makes the entire NP presuppositional; 
both its descriptive content and the bridging relation Rare presupposed rather than asserted. So 
(78a) in a categorical construal will be translated as (78b). 
(78)  a.  [The presidentlr DIED 
b.  3z83xRxz  /\  3!x8pRESIDENT(X)  /\  DIE (X ) 
Some comments are necessary.  Recall that the variable that adynamie existential quantifier 
binds need not be novel here, requantification is licit.  So if x happens to  be familiar,  3x  has 
no elfect on the context.  Now consider a formula of the form 3:r8Px.  Suppose P  is  some 
contingent property. If xis novel and it is not part of the context that everything is P, the update 
will fail since nothing prevents us from mapping x to some object that is not P. The update can 
only succeed if x is familiar and Px is already entailed by the context. Now suppose we are in 
a context where the USA have been mentioned before and R is fixed to "is the head of state of". 
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Then updating this context with the first conjunct :Jzä:JxRxz will only succeed if z is familiar 
and refers to  some state.  So the US  are a suitable value for z.  The variable x  is fresh  and is 
mapped to the head of this state.  Updating with :J!XäPRESIDENT(X)  doesn't change anything 
if it is known that the head of the state z-the US in the example-is a president, and there is 
no other familiar discourse referent that is known to be a president.  If  there are other familiar 
presidents, the update fails.  So if adefinite is topical, the uniqueness restriction is confined to 
the context.  Provided that the second step succeeded, updating with the third conjunct DIE(:") 
adds the information that the president of z died. Now suppose we fix R as the identity relation. 
Then updating with the first conjunct will always succeed--everything is identical to something. 
However, the second conjunct will only be successful if xis the one and only familiar discourse 
referent that is known to  be a president.  In  other words, in this case the president is  directly 
anaphoric. 
Malters are similar in the case of indefinite topics, except that we don't have a uniqueness con-
dition. So a sentence Iike 
(79)  [A presidentlt died 
will be felicitous if at least one president is either familiar in  the context or can be related to 
the context via bridging.  One might add that due to  a Gricean effect, it has to be more than 
president. So we predict a partitive reading of indefinite topics. 
The semantics of adverbial quantification is not our main concern here, so I refer the interested 
reader to the appendix. Suffice it to say that the truth conditions of a sentence involving adver-
bial quantification are exactly Chierchia's 1992. Adverbs of quantification unselectively bind all 
topics in their scope.  Furthermore the semantics for unary adverbs of quantification (i.e. those 
oceurring in sentences without an if-c1ause) given in the appendix has the effeet that the vari-
ables supplied by indefinite topies are bound by the adverb and the accompanying descriptive 
material ends up in the restrictive c1ause.  So our semantics for sentences (80a,b) are truth con-
ditionally equivalent to the DRT formulas (80c,d).  For simplicity of exposition, we do without 
the Davidsonian treatment of the main predicates. 
(80)  a.  If [a farmerlT owns a donkey, he usually beats it 
b.  [A farmerlT usually beats a donkey. 
c.  USUALLYx[FARMER(X)  /\  :JyDONKEY(y)  /\  OWN(X, y)] 
:JY[DONKEY(y) /\ OWN(X, y)  /\  BEAT(x, y)] 
d.  USUALLYx[FARMER(.T)]  :Jy[DONKEY(Y) /\  BEAT(~;,y)] 
In other words, our treatment of the impact of topicality has the effect of Chierchia's operation 
of "existential disclosure" in quantificational structures while it evokes anaphora + bridging else. 
Against this background, let us return to the issue of theticity. To account for the fact that c1auses 
without an overt topic are always thetic, i.e. construe the event argument of the predicate as topie, 
we postulate the following principle: 
Discourse Iinking principle 
Every atomic c1ause has a topic. 
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By "atomie clause" we refer to the main predieate of a clause together with its arguments and 
event related modifiers, but without any adverbs of quantifieation or other operators. The reason 
for this restrietion will be diseussed below.  As a eonsequenee of this prineiple, if none of the 
arguments of a predieate is  a topie, this part has to  be  taken over by the event argument.  We 
leave the issue open here how topie marking of this argument is done eompositionally; in any 
ease its syntaetie loeus should be identieal with the morpheme that binds the event argument. 
As a first eonsequenee, we prediet that the possibility of a weak eonstrual of some subjeet does 
not depend solelyon the main predieate but on the other arguments as  weil.  If  the objeet is a 
topie, the diseourse linking prineiple is fulfilled and the sentenee is felieitous. This aeeounts for 
the specificity effeets in (68) to (70). The eentral question to be addressed now is what happens if 
all overt arguments are weak (i.e. non-topieal) and thus the prineiple requires a thetie eonstrual. 
For eonereteness, let us look at an example. Aeeording to the formalization diseussed above and 
adopting a Davidsonian semanties, (81 a) is to be translated as (81 b). 
(81)  a.  A bell is ringing 
b.  :Jx8:JeRrx  1\  :JeRING(e)  1\  :JYBELL(y)  1\  THEME(e, y) 
So  the sentenee will be felieitous in a weak eonstrual if the event e of a bell ringing ean be 
linked to some familiar diseourse entity x via bridging (or,  at any  rate, an  appropriate eontext 
ean easily be aeeommodated). This solely depends on the possible values R ean take. We admit 
that we do not have a eomprehensive aeeount for this, but some preliminary eonsiderations are 
possible though. We agree with MeNally 1998 that the loeation of the deseribed event is crucial 
in  lieensing thetie statements, but we assign it a somewhat different role.  We assume that loeal 
nearness is the default value for R.  To take (8Ia) as example, without eontextual information 
the ringing of the bell is to be loealized in the loeal environment of the utteranee situation (that 
is always part of the eontext).  If the sentenee is part of a larger diseourse, the loeation may be 
set to (the loeal environment oD the loeation of a previously deseribed event. 
(82)  I arrived around 6.  A bell was ringing and dogs were barking. 
So in the absence of other information, R is  to be instantiated with  Ae, l.loe(e)  NE AR  loe(x). 
With this stipulation we prediet that all event types that ean be loealized make good thetie state-
ments.  This explains that non-statie predieates are usually [+WS]. States, not being loealized, 
should generally be [-WS], but this is blatantly false. As mentioned above, loeal PPs are [+WS]. 
We have to be eareful though. In the standard examples like 
(83)  Unieorns were in the garden 
the eomplement of the Ioeal preposition is speeifie, and thus it is very weil possible that not the 
deseribed state but the eomplement of the preposition is the topie.  11' this is true, loeal PPs with 
existential eomplements should be [  -WS]. This is in fact born out. 
(84)  a.  Unicorns are in gardens 
b.  Cups are on shelves 
e.  Rabbits are under trees 
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These sentences only have a generic reading. 
The claim "Statives are [-WS]" is born out as far as verbal predicates are concerned (provided 
the objects are non-specific).  The same holds for nominal predicates.  Needless to say that this 
is entirely independent from the duration of astate; a situation were two girls hold an ace each 
for 30 seconds during a card game cannot be described with the sentence 
(85)  Girls have aces 
So the only challenge far the above generalization are the existence of [+WS] adjectives like 
available,  visible, present.  I would like to argue that these adjectives do not constitute genuine 
thetic statements either.  What separates them from the bulk of the adjectives is  the fact that 
they have an implicit argument (available or visible for whom, present where).  I assume that 
such implicit arguments are anapharic per default.  They are construed as topics already in the 
lexicon. Gf course these topical implicit arguments can be bound by a null generic operator; it is 
well-known that visible also has a generic reading that is [  -WS] as expected. So the appropriate 
translation for (86a) is (86b). 
(86)  a.  Firemen are available 
b.  3zo3xRxz  1\  3xoPERSON(X)  1\  3SAVAILABLE(S)  1\  3WFIREMAN(W) 
1\ HOLDER(S, w)  1\  BENEFICIARY(s, x) 
In words, the sentence is felicitous in an existential reading if the beneficiary of the availability 
of the firemen is a discourse familiar individual. 
To sum up, we consider subject effects a consequence of a principle requiring that every clause 
has a topic.  Events but not states can function as  a topic,  so stative predicates are  [  -WS]  if 
none of their non-subject arguments (including implicit ones) can serve as topics.  Topic-hood 
was identified with discourse linking ar anaphoricity modulo bridging.  How does this apply to 
generic and quantified clauses?  Intuitively and according to the syntactic diagnostics, both in 
(87a) and (87b) the subjectfiremen is topic, but they are not anaphoric. 
(87)  a.  Firemen are aItruistic 
b.  Firemen are usually altruistic 
Recall that the Discourse Linking Principle was confined to atomic clauses. In both cases above, 
this is the clause that is to be translated as 
(88)  3xo3yRy.T  1\  3YOFIREMAN(Y)  1\  3SALTRUISTIC(S)  1\  HOLDER(S, y) 
The bare plural firemen  being the topic, the discourse linking is fulfilled in  (88).  This atomic 
clause serves as argument far the adverb of quantification (a null generic operator in (87a)).  As 
a result, the sentences co me out as truth conditionally equivalent to the DRT-formulae 
(89)  a.  GENx [FIREMAN(X)]3s[ALTRUISTIC(S)  1\  HOLDER(s, x)] 
b.  USUALLYx [FIREMAN(X)]3s[ALTRUISTIC(S)  1\  HOLDER(S,X)] 
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This holds under the proviso that localization is the only possible value for R in thetic statements. 
As mentioned above, in an appropriate context other values are possible as weil. I think that this 
is the reason for Glasbey's 1997 observation that weak construals with [-WS] predicates central 
for subject effects. This is partially blurred by the fact that non-subject arguments (even implicit 
ones) can serve as topic and thus save a weak reading of the subjec!. This entails that the contrast 
between [+WS] and [  -WS] predicates is entirely independent of  the semantics of the copula since 
copular constructions are always stative. So as in the case of the other SLP/ILP-contrasts, there 
is no evidence for an ambiguous copula. 
7.  Conclusion 
In this paper we investigated the issue whether the contrasts subsumed under the "stage level/in-
dividuallevel distinction" in the literature provide evidence for an ambiguous copula.  Some of 
OUf findings are negative; we argued that Carlson's as weil as Kratzer's and Diesing's proposals 
face considerable empirical problems. Furthermore we found that instead of a uniform SLP/ILP-
distinction, there are at least three 10gicaIly independent contrasts that account for the alleged 
stage level/individual level diagnostics.  So any  attempt for a unified theory is  bound to  fail 
from the onse!.  Additionally we argued that one of these three distinctions-the one between 
permanent and temporary properties-is not represented grammatically but rather a matter of 
world knowledge. 
On  the positive side,  we  presented evidence that the ability of a predicate to  admit a weak 
construal of its subject is determined by the interaction of two well-established and indepen-
dently  motivated factors,  the aspectual distinction between statives and non-statives,  and the 
topic!comment structure of the clause in question. Non-stative predicates always allow a weak 
construal of the subject.  In the case of stative predicates, this depends on the question whether 
one of the non-subject arguments (including implicit ones) can be construed as  a topic.  If this 
is possible, the subject can get a weak construal. These two facts were derived from a principle 
requiring that every clause must be discourse-linkable (or,  in  other words,  must have a topic) 
together with the assumption that events but not states are localized. Thus localization may pro-
vide a discourse link for eventive, but not for stative clauses.  So two of the three mentioned 
distinctions (permanent vs. temporary predicates and predicates that do allow vs.  those that do 
not allow a weak subject) are entirely independent from the semantics of the copula. 
At present we cannot give an  explanation for the different acceptability of predicates in per-
ception reports.  Here again our only result is  a negative one:  we collected evidence that all 
predicates have a Davidsonian argument, so we cannot adopt an explanation along the lines of 
Higginbotham 1983  and Kratzer 1995.  In  view of the "copula effects" observed by  Carlson 
1977, here the semantics of the copula may in  fact  be crucial (see also the cases dicussed by 
Maienborn (this volume». 
(90)  a.  We saw the emperor naked 
b.  *We saw the emperor be naked 
Similar effects have been noticed by Stump 1985 in connection with  absolute constructions. 
Some predicates (SLPs in his terminology) allow a conditional interpretation of absolutive ad-
juncts, while ILPs invariably receive an factive interpretation. 
(91)  a.  Asleep John might look like astatue 
b.  Blond, John might look like astatue 
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Similar to their behavior in perception reports, copular constructions only admit a factive inter-
pretation. 
(92)  Being asleep, lohn might look like astatue 
Future research has to address the nature of these contrasts in general and their interaction with 
the semantics of the copula in particular. 
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Appendix: The semantics of adverbial quantification 
Binary adverbial quantification We assume that there is a two-place propositional functor cor-
responding to each adverb of quantification, including the null generic quantifier.  Its semantics 
is defined as 
{(w,g) E O'IQ({hlg  S;;  h &  11<p11({(w, h)}) =I  f/J  & 
~3h' :2  g(II<p11 ({ (w, h')}) =I  f/J  & h' c  h)}) 
({hlg S;;  h &  11<p  /\  1jJII( {(w, h)}) =I  f/J})} 
where Q is the generalized quantifier corresponding to Qadv.
ll So we evaluate every possibility 
(w, g)  in  0' separately.  It survives in  the output context iff Q-many minimal extension h of 
"We presuppose the f(x) i'  0 presupposes that f(x) is defined. 
93 Gerhard Jäger 
9  where 1J  is defined and true in w  can be extended to  an  assignment k  where 1J  /\  1jJ  is true. 
Consider sentence (93a), translated as (93b). We assume the R set to its default value "=". 
(93)  a.  If [a manlT has a cat, he usually beats it 
b.  MOST(:lxo:ly(x =  y)  /\  :lyoM(y)  /\  :lzC(z)  /\  H(y, z))(B(x, z)) 
The evaluation of this formula crucially depends on whether the variables :r  and y are novel or 
familiar.  Suppose x  is familar.  Then only those possibilities  (10, g)  will provide a non-empty 
output under update with the protasis where g(x)  is  a man that has a cat in  w.  So if there is 
a minimal extension of 9  that provides a non-empty output under update with the protasis, it 
is 9  itself.  In the spirit of de Hoop and de Swart 1989 we assume that quantification is  ruled 
out if the restrictor set is a singleton.  Thus x must be novel.  Suppose y is familiar.  Under the 
minmal assumption that the domain of the model is not a singleton, updating with the conjunct 
o:ly(x  =  y)  will fail.  Thus the restrictor set is empty in this case, which amounts to vacuous 
quantification that is ruled out as weil. Consequently both x and y must be novel. It is easy to see 
that exactly those minimal extensions h of 9 that map both x and y to the same individual such 
that h(x) is a man who has a cat in 10 will provide a non-empty output. There are as many such 
extensions as there are men who have a cat in w.  Likewise the set of minimal extensions h that 
make the antecedence c\ause true but the the consequence c\ause false has the same cardinality 
as the set of individuals that are man that have a cat and don't beat it in w.  So (w, g) will survive 
update with the entire formula iff most man that have a cat beat it in w. 
Unary adverbial quantification  We furthermore assume that there is  a unary propositional 
operator for each adverb of quantification. Its semantics is given by 
IIQadv(1J)II(a)  {(w,g) E aIQ({h::J glll1JII({(w,h)}) isdefined  & 
,:lh'::J g(II1JII({(w,h')}) isdefined  & h' eh)) 
({h::J glll1JII({(w,h)}) 10}) 
Roughly this say that a possibility (w, g)  survives update iff Q-many minimal extensions of 9 
where update with 1J is defined are such that 1J  is true. Again an example: 
(94)  a.  [A manlT usually walks 
b.  USUALLY(:lxo:ly(x  =  y)  /\  :lyoM(y) /\ W(y)) 
As above, the set of minimal extensions of  9 that make update with the argument formula defined 
is either empty or a singleton if either x  or y are familiar.  Thus they must be novel.  Likewise, 
there are as many minimal extension of 9 that make update with 1J  defined as there are men in 
10, and of them as many make 1J true as there are man who walk in w. So (w, g)  will survive iff 
most men walk in w. 
94 